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CASENOTES
USUAL SUSPECTS BEWARE: 'WALK, DON'T RUN"
THROUGH DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOODS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution' is
"designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by en-
forcement officials with the privacy and personal security of indi-
viduals."'2 The Amendment is currently interpreted as consisting
of two separate clauses, the first generally prohibiting unreason-
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states by in-
corporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
2. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)). The Fourth Amendment is primarily enforced through
the exclusionary rule rather than through constitutional challenges to police practices.
The exclusionary rule deems inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, so if a citizen arrested for possession of a concealed weapon successfully con-
tends that it was discovered during an illegal search, the weapon will be suppressed as
evidence. Since defendants apprehended in violation of the Fourth Amendment are fre-
quently acquitted once the incriminating evidence has been suppressed, the exclusionary
rule theoretically gives law enforcement officers an incentive to adhere to constitutional
guidelines. For further discussion, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding
that the exclusionary rule is binding on state courts), Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
394 (1914) (holding that the exclusionary rule is binding on federal courts), and Adina
Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns": The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 347-48 (1996).
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able searches and seizures, and the second requiring the estab-
lishment of probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant.3
Hence, only those government searches and seizures requiring a
warrant necessitate the establishment of probable cause, and all
other searches and seizures simply need to be "reasonable."4
Despite this rather broad interpretation of the Amendment, the
Supreme Court has nonetheless "imposed a presumptive warrant
requirement for all searches and seizures and has required prob-
able cause in order for a warrantless search or seizure to be rea-
sonable."5 Predictably, this blanket warrant requirement has be-
come riddled with exceptions,6 generally indicating that in
situations calling for immediacy of action, a warrant is not re-
quired and probable cause alone will be sufficient to render the
search or seizure "reasonable."
In the landmark decision of Terry v. Ohio,7 the United States
Supreme Court eliminated even the probable cause requirement
for a "stop and frisk," stating that this type of police conduct must
comply only with the "general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures."' The Terry Court held that, in the absence
of probable cause for arrest, where an officer reasonably suspects
that criminal activity is imminent, he is justified in stopping
("seizing") the suspect; once the stop has been made, the officer, if
he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, may conduct a limited search for weapons
in order to ensure his own safety and that of others.9
3. William D. Anderson, Jr., Investigation and Police Practice: Overview of the
Fourth Amendment, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 597 (1994). Although there is a minority view which
maintains that only those searches and seizures conducted pursuant to a warrant are rea-
sonable, and thus constitutional, the view presently credited by a majority of the Court
asserts that the two clauses should be considered independently of one another.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 781 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that exigent circumstances provide exceptions to warrant requirement); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 (1950) (holding that no warrant is required for
search incident to arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925) (holding
that no warrant is required for search of automobile based upon probable cause); see also
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara
and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 388 n.14 (1988).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. Id. at 20.
9. Id. at 27.
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In the recent decision of Illinois v. Wardlow,'° the Supreme
Court considered the question of whether evasion of law enforce-
ment officers in an area known for a high incidence of crime is,
without more, sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify a stop-and-frisk. 1 Although re-affirming the principle that
presence in a high-crime neighborhood cannot be used as the sole
basis to support a Terry stop,' 2 the Court maintained that since
flight is the "consummate act of evasion," when a person is ob-
served fleeing from the police in an area with a high incidence of
criminal activity, the two taken together are sufficient to create a
reasonable inference of wrongdoing.1
3
The purpose of this note is to explore the evolution of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since the decision in Terry, and to dis-
cuss how Wardlow reflects an ongoing trend in which courts are
allowing reasonable suspicion to be based on generalized factors
that have been divorced from the requirements of particularized
suspicion and a likelihood of imminent criminal activity. Part II
will discuss the evolution of the reasonable suspicion standard
from a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment into an ex-
pansive legal doctrine. Part III will discuss the recent decision in
Wardlow, and demonstrate that, although decided consistently
with developing legal trends, this case represents a further de-
parture from the basic underlying principles of Terry. Part IV will
discuss various factors which have historically been considered in
determining reasonable suspicion, and will consider whether
Wardlow will affect the manner in which they may be weighed
and combined.
II. THE EVER-EXPANDING SCOPE OF THE TERRY STOP
"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to
a free society .... 114
10. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
1L Id. at 126.
12. Id. at 124; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979).
13. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
14. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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A. Terry v. Ohio: The Seed is Planted
In Terry, the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether a stop-and-frisk conducted in the absence of probable
cause automatically violates the Fourth Amendment. 5 On the af-
ternoon of October 31, 1963, an experienced police officer in
downtown Cleveland observed three men alternately conferring
with each other on the street and strolling over to stare in a store-
front window.'6 His suspicions aroused, the officer confronted the
men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their
names." When his request was refused, the officer frisked the
men and discovered guns on two of them-defendants Terry and
Chilton-who were subsequently convicted for carrying a con-
cealed weapon." The defendants appealed, contending that the
guns were seized during the course of an unlawful search, and
that the trial court therefore improperly denied their motion to
suppress the evidence. 9 Because the officer did not have probable
cause for arrest prior to patting the men down and discovering
the weapons, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether probable cause is always required before any
search or seizure may be considered "reasonable."
The Terry Court recognized that "whenever a police officer ac-
costs an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person"2 ' for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2' However, to justify this seizure, some reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity is required, and that suspicion must
amount to more than just an inarticulable hunch.22 The Court
noted that although the protection of the Fourth Amendment
does extend to citizens on the street,23 the interest of the govern-
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
16. Id. at 5-6.
17. Id. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. Id. at 8. Terry and Chilton were tried and convicted at the same time, and peti-
tioned for certiorari together. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, Chil-
ton died, leaving only Terry's conviction for review. Id. at 5 n.2.
20. Id. at 16.
21. "[W]hen the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen.., a 'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n.16.
22. "[A) simple 'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.'" Id. at 22
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
23. Id. at 9 (citing Beck, 379 U.S. 89, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960),
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948),
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ment in "effective crime prevention and detection" outweighs the
privacy interest of the citizen where the officer has reason to sus-
pect imminent wrongdoing.
2
Once the decision to detain the suspect has been made, the
Terry Court held that a limited search of the suspect's outer
clothing would be allowed for the purposes of permitting the offi-
cer to ensure his own safety.25 The Court also commented that
"[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger."26 Thus, the original rationale be-
hind allowing this warrantless search was to ensure the safety of
the officer, and not to uncover evidence of wrongdoing.
27
The issue in Terry is not the propriety of the police conduct it-
self, but rather the admissibility of the evidence (a weapon) un-
covered during the limited search of the defendant.2" Therefore,
the fundamental holding of Terry is that, as long as the scope of a
search conducted pursuant to a stop-and-frisk is limited to that
necessary to ensure the safety of the officer, the search does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons recovered will
be admissible evidence. 29 Notably, the Terry Court emphasized
the necessity of the narrowness of the search, stating that "even a
limited search of the outer clothing.., constitutes a severe, al-
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliat-
ing experience."'
and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). The Fourth Amendment is said to ap-
ply to any place or situation where the individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of
privacy." Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). For a list of cases dis-
cussing this concept, see Anderson, supra note 3, at 599 nn.16-20.
24. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
25. Id. at 23-24.
26. Id. at 27.
27. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (The "purpose
of limited weapons search was 'not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence.'") (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972)).
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12; see also supra note 2.
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
30. Id. at 24-25. Chief Justice Warren provided a very graphic definition of a pat-
down:
The officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's
body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits,
20011
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When applied to the facts of the case, the Terry Court held that
the acts of the defendant were such that they aroused a reason-
able suspicion of wrongdoing, thus justifying the initial seizure.'
Further, since the officer limited his search to a brief pat-down
for weapons, the scope of the search was reasonably limited to
that intended to discover weapons, and, therefore, did not violate
the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant.32
Ultimately, the analysis for unreasonableness that emerges
from Terry involves two considerations. First, to justify an initial
seizure, the officer must be able to identify specific facts which,
when viewed in light of his own experience, give rise to a reason-
able suspicion of impending criminal activity. 3 Second, to justify
the search, the officer must have reason to believe that the sus-
pect is armed and dangerous, and the search must be reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial
interference.34
B. Post-Terry Developments: The Weed Begins to Grow
1. Defining Reasonable Suspicion
"Reasonable suspicion" has eluded quantification, but has been
generally defined as a "fair probability"" that is "considerably
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."36 However, there must be a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the individual of criminal activity, 7 and that
justification must be based upon "specific and articulable facts."38
waistline, and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and the entire
surface of the legs down to the feet.
Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting L. L. Priar & T. F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45
J. CmiM. L. C. & P. S. 481, 481 (1954)).
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 20-21.
34. Id.; see also David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and
Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 662-63 (1994).
35. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
36. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
37. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 232 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
38. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1968).
USUAL SUSPECTS BEWARE
Hence, random stops are not considered reasonable; there must
be some specific fact upon which reasonable suspicion could be
based which makes the stopped individual more likely to be in-
volved in criminal activity than an ordinary citizen.39
Additionally, reasonable suspicion is judged according to the
totality of the circumstances as seen by the officer in light of his
experience,4 ° although the inference must be reasonable and
amount to more than a mere hunch.4' Courts have continually re-
fused to establish bright-line standards, stating that the test is
"necessarily imprecise" since each case is to be decided on the ba-
sis of its own facts.42
2. What Constitutes a Seizure?
Even the briefest of stops must satisfy the reasonableness re-
quirement,' and whether or not a seizure has occurred is deter-
mined according to whether a reasonable person would have felt
that he was free to leave and go about his business.' Thus, a sei-
zure may occur on the basis of words alone; no physical restraint
is necessary to invoke Fourth Amendment concerns.45
In addition, actions constituting a restraint on liberty sufficient
to lead a person to conclude that he is not free to leave will vary
"not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with
the setting in which the conduct occurs."46 For example, merely
asking an individual his identity or requesting to see identifica-
tion has been held not to constitute a seizure because (theoreti-
cally) a reasonable person would recognize his right to refuse and
39. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
40. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; United States v.
Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980)).
4L Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Margaret Ray-
mond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighbor-
hood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 102-03 (1999).
42. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
43. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
44. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544);
Royer, 460 U.S. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554);
Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
45. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
46. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.
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continue on his way." In practice, however, the problems with
this theory are obvious. A reasonable person, when asked for
identification, would not assume that he has a right to refuse and
continue on his way, but would instead feel compelled to remain
and abide by the officer's requests. 8 Moreover, considering the
recent holding in Wardlow, a refusal to cooperate with a law en-
forcement officer, when combined with continuing on one's way,
could easily be construed as an evasion of the police, which might
then amount to a basis for reasonable suspicion if that individual
is in a high-crime neighborhood or otherwise suspicious in ap-
pearance.49
3. Limiting the Search: How Far Can You Go?
Wherever a citizen may be said to harbor a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the Fourth Amendment guarantees freedom from
unreasonable government intrusion."° Hence, government offi-
cials are required to obtain a warrant prior to initiating a
search.51 However, as in all other areas of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence, a few exceptions to the general warrant requirement
have arisen.52 For example, although historically a warrant was
required before law enforcement officers were permitted to open
47. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
48. For an interesting decision illustrating the misconceptions police officers them-
selves may harbor concerning an individual's right to refuse to provide identification, see
Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000). In this case, an inexperienced police offi-
cer attempted to detain and ultimately arrested a criminal defense attorney who exercised
his right to refuse to provide identification. Despite quoting the relevant Utah statute to
the officer several times, the attorney was forcibly removed from his vehicle and shoved to
his knees. Id. at 1182-83.
49. Cf United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding presence
in a high-crime area and a willingness to answer questions insufficient to establish rea-
sonable suspicion). Contra United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a refusal to comply with request for identification is not enough to establish
reasonable suspicion); State v. Warfield, No. 23932-9-I1, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1299, at
*11-12 (Wash. Ct. App. July 21, 2000) (holding that presence in a high-crime neighbor-
hood, refusal to answer verbal summons issued without reasonable suspicion, and walking
away from the police are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry
stop).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (authorizing excep-




any closed container, courts have gradually eliminated this re-
quirement for moveable containers in extraordinary circum-
stances as long as there is probable cause supporting the initial
search.53 An interesting question to ask here is whether courts
might now extend this premise to a closed container discovered
during a Terry stop, allowing it to be opened on the basis of rea-
sonable suspicion rather than probable cause, in an attempt to
discover if the suspect is armed and dangerous.54
The constitutionality of a search is not judged according to its
success; a search unconstitutional at its inception cannot be later
justified by any incriminating evidence it may uncover.55 On the
other hand, "a search which is reasonable at its inception may
violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable inten-
sity and scope."56 Consequently, the scope of a search should be
"'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which ren-
dered its initiation permissible,"57 and in searches conducted pur-
suant to a Terry stop, the scope of the intrusion is intended to be
a central element in the determination of its reasonableness. 58
4. Judicial Expansions of the Terry Doctrine
In the years following the Terry decision, the Court continued
to recognize that any seizure not subject to the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment must be based on a balancing of govern-
ment and private interests.59 However, in a progression of cases,
53. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that the war-
rantless search of a paper bag found in the trunk of a car is constitutional where there was
probable cause to search the bag even though no probable cause to search the vehicle);
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (holding that the opening of a closed paper bag
found on the floor of a suspect's car during a consensual search for narcotics is constitu-
tional). But cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 834-35 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(asserting that a closed paper bag may be seized, but not searched, without a warrant).
54. For further discussion, see infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-28; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347-48 (1957) (per curiam); Di Re,
332 U.S. at 586-87; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931).
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (The key princi-
ple of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness-the balancing of competing interests.'")
(quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring)); Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (determining constitutionality "involves a weighing of
20011
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the United States Supreme Court has required less and less evi-
dence to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify an
initial stop.6"
Initially, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,6' the Supreme
Court extended the Terry premise to allow a border stop of a
moving vehicle predicated on reasonable suspicion alone.62 How-
ever, after this early expansion, the Court seemed content to
leave the Terry standard alone for awhile. For example, in the de-
cision of Brown v. Texas,63 the Court readily adhered to the origi-
nal narrowly circumscribed holding of Terry by ruling that a
Terry stop was unconstitutional where the officer only stopped
the defendant to ascertain his identity and did not have a reason-
able suspicion to believe he was engaged in criminal conduct.'
Brown is also notable for its holding that presence in a high-crime
neighborhood is not enough, standing alone, to support a reason-
able, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a
65crime.
In United States v. Cortez,66 the Court first emphasized the ne-
cessity of a totality of the circumstances test, holding that objec-
tive facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting involvement in
criminal activity will provide a sufficient basis to justify an inves-
tigative stop. 6v Additionally, the Court articulated that a police
officer is entitled to rely on common sense inferences about hu-
man behavior, so long as those inferences establish a particular-
ized and objective basis for the establishment of reasonable suspi-
cion."
Florida v. Royer69 clarified that an investigatory detention pur-
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty");
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (stating that reasonableness
depends on "a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers").
60. See Harris, supra note 34, at 665.
61. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
62. Id. at 879-80.
63. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
64. Id. at 51-52.
65. Id. at 52.
66. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
67. Id. at 417-18.
68. Id. at 418.
69. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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suant to a lawful Terry stop must be temporary and can "last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."v°
Royer also re-affirmed the basic constitutional principle that
when an officer without reasonable suspicion or probable cause
approaches an individual, that individual has a right to ignore
the police and go about his business.7'
In United States v. Sokolow,72 the Court reiterated that the
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective
justification in order to validate a Terry stop, and re-emphasized
the necessity of a totality-of-the-circumstances test.7" In addition,
the Court clarified that the "relevant inquiry is not whether con-
duct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that at-
taches to particular types of noncriminal acts." 4 Notably, in its
last Fourth Amendment decision prior to Wardlow,75 the Court
held that the right to move from one place to another according to
inclination is an attribute of personal liberty protected by the
Constitution.76
On the other hand, both state and lower federal courts have
gradually-and without hesitation-increased the permissible
scope of both a seizure77 and a search 7 based upon reasonable
70. Id. at 500.
7L Id. at 498.
72. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 10.
75. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
76. Id. at 47.
77. When an officer reasonably believes that a suspect is armed, courts have held that
he may handcuff the suspect, block the suspect's vehicle, require the suspect to lie prone
on the ground, and approach the victim with a drawn firearm. See, e.g., Houston v. Does,
174 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999) (use of handcuffs); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181,
1189-90 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "especially intrusive means" may be used in connec-
tion with suspicion of a violent crime); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th
Cir. 1993) (forcing suspects to lie on ground at gunpoint); United States v. Lechuga, 925
F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1991) (listing cases allowing handcuffing and approach with
drawn firearm); United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986) (approach
with drawn firearm).
78. For example, prior to the decision in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
various U.S. courts of appeals had held that using a dog to detect drugs in luggage either
does not constitute a search (Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits), or is a search
requiring only reasonable suspicion (Ninth Circuit). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
505 n.10 (1983) (listing cases). In Place, the Supreme Court settled the question by holding
that because a "canine sniff' does not require opening the luggage, the sniff does not con-
stitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S. at 707; see also
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2000) (holding that walking a dog around the
2001]
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suspicion. Although the Supreme Court intended the holding of
Terry to provide only a narrow exception to the probable cause
requirement, and explicitly emphasized the need to limit the in-
trusiveness of a search conducted in the absence of probable
cause,79 courts have been increasingly lenient in allowing stops of
a longer duration and searches of a more intrusive nature. Simi-
larly, the requirement that a search based upon reasonable suspi-
cion is permissible only when there is reason to believe the sus-
pect is armed and dangerous has been primarily ignored;"
instead, courts tend to focus on whether the initial stop was rea-
sonable rather than whether the accompanying search was con-
stitutional."1
A frequently overlooked aspect of stop-and-frisk cases is that
courts only see "the most skewed sample of all Terry stops" since
the only reported cases focus on guilty persons-those who were
actually found to be in possession of a weapon or other contra-
band after being detained.82 Thus, there are "many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn
up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about
which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear."3
Hence, the judiciary should tread cautiously in expanding the
permissible scope of a Terry stop, for although a few additional
criminals might very well be discovered and detained, each deci-
sion that lessens the stringency of the Fourth Amendment stan-
dards to which the police are held results in far more innocent
exterior of a vehicle is not enough to transform a seizure into a search).
79. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
80. Cf. United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971) (announcing
"automatic pat down" rule for companions of arrestee). But see United States v. Bell, 762
F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sawyers, 74 F. Supp. 2d 784, 792 (M.D.
Tenn. 1999).
81. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 n.2 (2000) (stating that certiorari
was only granted to address the constitutionality of the seizure, and not the accompanying
search).
82. Harris, supra note 34, at 679.
83. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see
also Harris, supra note 34. Harris states that:
[R]eported cases focus only on those with guilty motivations. Others who are
without guilt are nevertheless stopped and frisked. They are not charged be-
cause the search yields no evidence and no reported case ever results. Even
stops and frisks that do not result in charges carry a cost... Large numbers




citizens being robbed of the protection of the Fourth Amendment
under the guise of "reasonable" suspicion.
III. ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW: ANOTHER REASONABLE SUSPECT
In Illinois v. Wardlow,' the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the question of whether a man observed in a "high-crime"
neighborhood who began to run at the sight of the police could
constitutionally be seized based upon a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing-that is, whether evasion of law enforcement officers
in an area known for a high incidence of crime is, without more,
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.85
A. Facts
Around noon on September 9, 1995, eight police officers in four
police cars were driving through a Chicago neighborhood known
for heavy drug trafficking.8" Officers Nolan and Harvey, both as-
signed to the special operations section of the Chicago police de-
partment, occupied the last car in the caravan." Although Officer
Nolan testified that he was in uniform, he could not recall
whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked vehicle. 8 As
the caravan passed through the area, Officer Nolan observed de-
fendant Wardlow, a forty-four-year-old African-American man,
standing next to a building and holding a white bag.89 Allegedly,
Wardlow looked in their general direction and then fled." Officers
Nolan and Harvey followed the defendant, and eventually appre-
hended Wardlow when he began to run toward their car.9 Officer
Nolan exited the vehicle and, without identifying himself as a po-
lice officer, conducted an immediate pat-down search for weap-
84. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
85. Id. at 123.
86. Id. at 121; People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (M. App. Ct. 1997).
87. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
88. Id. at 137 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wardlow, 678
N.E.2d at 66.
89. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-22.
90. Id. at 122. However, as noted by the Illinois appellate court, the evidence was in-
conclusive as to whether the presence of the police caravan was the actual stimulus for the
defendanfs flight. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 67.
9L Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 66.
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ons, because, in his experience, "it was common for there to be
weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions."92 After
removing the bag from the possession of the defendant, Officer
Nolan squeezed the bag and felt an object the weight and size of a
gunY The officer then opened the bag and discovered a handgun
along with five live rounds of ammunition.94
B. Procedural History
Following a bench trial, Wardlow was convicted of "unlawful
use of a weapon by a felon."95 He appealed the decision solely on
the basis that the trial court erred in not suppressing the gun re-
covered by Officer Nolan, maintaining that the search and seizure
were conducted in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.9 6
An Illinois appellate court reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to indicate that
Wardlow was observed in an adequately defined high-crime
area. However, the court did not hold that presence in a high-
crime neighborhood, when combined with flight, could never es-
tablish reasonable suspicion, and limited their decision accord-
ingly.9" Rather, the court rationalized that the high-crime area
should be "sufficiently localized and identifiable"99 in order "to
'assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is
not subject to arbitrary invasions...' simply because he or she
happens to live in a neighborhood where crime is prevalent." °0
The appellate court also based its decision on the observation that
the evidence did not indicate that the defendant's flight was nec-
essarily correlated with an expectation of an encounter with the
police.''
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the decision of




96. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 66.
97. Id. at 67.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 68.
100. Id. (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
101. Id.
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the appellate court; however, they disagreed with its finding that
the record was too vague to support an inference that the defen-
dant was apprehended in a location with a high incidence of drug
trafficking.112 Rather, the supreme court maintained that
" [a]uthorizing the police to chase down and question all those
who take flight upon their approach would undercut [the right to
avoid interaction with the police] and upset the balance struck in
Terry between the individual's right to personal security and the
public's interest in prevention of crime."" 3 Since flight is simply
an exercise of a right to "go on one's way," and presence in a high-
crime area alone is insufficient to justify a Terry stop, the su-
preme court rationalized that the two together, without more,
should never provide a sufficiently particularized basis for the es-
tablishment of reasonable suspicion.0 4 Although the character of
the neighborhood and evasive behavior may be considered in de-
termining the existence of reasonable suspicion, these factors
need to be corroborated with independent suspicious circum-
stances suggesting that the defendant's flight was actually moti-
vated by criminal guilt.
0 5
C. Holding and Rationale: The Wicked Flee?°6
In a brief opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Su-
preme Court, holding that while presence in a high-crime area
alone is insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspi-
cion,'0° when combined with "headlong flight" from the police, a
rational inference of criminal activity is created.' °
The Court refused to certify the establishment of a per se rule
that flight from the police is always indicative of criminal behav-
102. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 486 (M. 1998).
103. Id. at 487 (quoting State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 363-64 (1992)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 488.
106. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion."
Proverbs 28:1. But cf Proverbs 27:12 ('The prudent see danger and take refuge, but the
simple keep going and suffer for it."); Proverbs 22:3 ("A shrewd man sees trouble coming
and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty."); Romans 3:10 ('There is no one
righteous, not even one.").
107. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
108. Id.
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ior, but instead reinforced the necessity of a totality-of-the-
circumstances test "based on commonsense judgments and infer-
ences about human behavior." °9 However, in an attempt to align
Wardlow with Royer"' and Bostick,"' the Court held that
"[a]llowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive
and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's
right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in
the face of police questioning."" 2 The majority additionally com-
mented that "[filight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's
business;' in fact, it is just the opposite."" 3 Accordingly, where a
suspect flees unprovoked from an officer, regardless of his ration-
ale or intent to do so, police are justified in using that factor to
determine the existence of reasonable suspicion.
Ultimately, the Court's holding implies that since both the
character of the neighborhood" 4 and evasive behavior"' are
among relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis, the
combination of these two factors, without more, is sufficient to es-
tablish reasonable suspicion." 6 Although claiming to base its de-
109. Id. at 124-25.
110. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (holding that an individual, when ap-
proached by an officer in the absence of reasonable suspicion, has a right to ignore the po-
lice and continue about his business).
111. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (holding that a refusal to cooperate
with the police does not, without more, establish reasonable suspicion).
112. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
113. Id. But cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("Absent
special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may ref-
use to cooperate and go on his way."); Raymond, supra note 41, at 130 n.94 (stating that
"at the stage where an officer could not compel cooperation," flight simply anticipates re-
fusal to cooperate with the officer's potential decision to stop).
114. ",An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone,
is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that a person is commit-
ting a crime," but "officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a loca-
tion in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant fur-
ther investigation." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
144 (1972) (holding the fact that a stop occurred in a high-crime area relevant in the de-
termination of reasonable suspicion).
115. "Headlong flight.., is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indica-
tive of wrongdoing, but is certainly suggestive of such." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that evasive behavior is
relevant in a court's reasonable suspicion determination); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (holding the same).
116. But see generally, Harris, supra note 34. This article, written six years before the
Wardlow decision, stated that:
If neither the innocent but necessary activity of being in a high crime area,
nor avoidance of the police could supply a sufficient basis for a Terry stop,
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cision on a totality-of-the-circumstances determination, the Court
appears to predicate its entire ruling on these two factors alone,
without considering any of the other circumstances in this case
that might also have been relevant to the reasonable suspicion
analysis.
D. The Dissent
Four of the Supreme Court justices dissented from the major-
ity, joining in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens."' Although
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's rejection of a per se
rule either endorsing or condemning the use of flight in the rea-
sonable suspicion analysis,"' he did not believe that the circum-
stances of this case supported a reasonable suspicion of imminent
criminal activity."9
Initially, Justice Stevens recognized that the motivation behind
an apparent evasion of the police will depend in part on the exis-
tence of other possible explanations for the flight. 2 ° Since "[t]he
probative force of the inferences to be drawn from flight is a func-
tion of the varied circumstances in which it occurs," when flight is
used as a factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, it should be
both factors together should not support one either. Those who find it neces-
sary to be in high crime areas are often the same people who find it prudent
to exercise their constitutional right to avoid the police. To allow a seizure
based on the combination of the two factors, each insufficient by itself, robs
both factors of any significance. Thus, the conjunction of location and evasion
should never be enough, alone, to give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 686. However, the author appears to disregard the fact that the factors upon which
the Court based its decision in Terry also appear innocent when considered alone (looking
into a store window and talking to someone on the street), but when viewed together in
light of the circumstances of the case provided a sufficient inference of criminal activity.
117. Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
118. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408 (1896). In Hickory, the Court stated that:
[Tihe evasion of or flight from justice seems now nearly reduced to its true
place in the administration of the criminal law, namely, that of a circum-
stance-a fact which it is always of importance to take into consideration,
and combined with others may afford a strong evidence of guilt, but which,
like any other piece of presumptive evidence, it is equally absurd and danger-
ous to invest with infallibility.
Id. at 419-20.
119. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 137 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
120. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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evaluated in light of any pertinent attendant circumstances.' 2 '
Relevant considerations listed by Justice Stevens included "the
time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the
neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the
runner is dressed, the direction and speed of the flight," and
whether the behavior observed might otherwise be characterized
as unreasonable. 122
Hence, Justice Stevens appears to have placed some impor-
tance on the subjective intentions of the defendant, questioning
whether there might be a valid reason for the flight other than a
mere desire to avoid apprehension, and if so, its relative prob-
ability.123 For although "there are unquestionably circumstances
in which a person's flight is suspicious," there are also "undenia-
bly instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent rea-
sons," and the strength of the inference which may be drawn from
the flight should depend on those other possible motivations for
the flight. 24
Perhaps the defendant was not running from the police at all-
as Justice Stevens pointed out:
A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons-to catch
up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an im-
pending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get
home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to
avoid contact with a bore or bully, or simply to answer the call of na-
ture-any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in
the vicinity.
125
However, even if a desire to evade the police did serve as the pri-
mary motivation for the defendant's flight, valid reasons for
wishing to avoid police contact might include fear of the police
themselves (especially in minority communities), fear of being
apprehended as a guilty party, a belief that the officer's presence
indicates nearby criminal activity, or an unwillingness to appear
as a witness.'2 6
121. Id. at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 129-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf Alberty v.
United States, 162 U.S. 499, 510 (1896) (stating that flight may be laid before a jury as
evidence of guilt, but may not be dispositive).
124. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. See id. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that "[amny person...
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Hence, Justice Stevens drew attention to the insufficiency of
the facts used to support the inference that Wardlow's flight was
actually provoked by the presence of the police.'27 Significant un-
resolved facts included whether Officer Nolan was driving an
unmarked vehicle, whether the other officers were in uniform,
whether there were other people at the location where Wardlow
was first observed, how fast the cars were driving, and whether
the caravan had passed by when the defendant began to run.2 '
Further, although Justice Stevens acknowledged that this
would be a different case if the officers had possessed credible in-
formation identifying a specific address, and the defendant began
to run when the police converged upon that particular resi-
dence,'29 he implied that the reasonable suspicion analysis should
require a more stringent factual inquiry when the area being
earmarked as "high-crime" is a much broader and undefined ter-
ritory.2 ° Justice Stevens pointed out that "because many factors
providing innocent motivations for unprovoked flight are concen-
trated in high crime areas, the character of the neighborhood ar-
guably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather than
more so."
131
Ultimately, Justice Stevens "[was] not persuaded that the mere
fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the direction
of a passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a
forcible stop and frisk." 1 32 The State has the burden to articulate
facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion, 33 and since Jus-
tice Stevens did not believe that Illinois adequately discharged
that burden in this instance, he would have affirmed the judg-
ment of the Illinois Supreme Court.
3 1
is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous").
127. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 137 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 138 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 138 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 139 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 140 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
134. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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E. Analysis of Holding
1. Factual Insufficiency
Initially, as Justice Stevens recognized in his dissent, the ma-
jority opinion failed to acknowledge that there are several impor-
tant factual determinations left to be resolved in this case before
a reasonable suspicion determination should be made."5 As
pointed out by the Illinois appellate court, it is far from clear that
the police caravan served as the actual stimulus for Wardlow's
flight.'36 Certainly, four cars slowly cruising through a neighbor-
hood known for a high incidence of criminal activity would appear
suspicious-and conceivably dangerous-even to an impartial by-
stander, who might then find it prudent to leave the scene at a
rapid pace. If the vehicles were unmarked, it is quite plausible
that Wardlow did not realize that the cars were actually occupied
by law enforcement officers, and that he instead chose to run for
reasons entirely unrelated to a police presence. Moreover, the fact
that Wardlow was apprehended when he ran toward Officer
Nolan's car137 supports the inference that the car was unmarked.
Alternatively, if Wardlow ran toward a marked car, then a ra-
tional conclusion would be that it was not the police caravan that
instigated Wardlow's flight in the first place.
Further, although reasonable suspicion should be determined
based upon the facts as they appear to the officer at the time of
the seizure, 138 other explanations for the flight should be calcu-
lated into the reasonable suspicion analysis, even if those expla-
nations fail to appear as plausible to the officer as they do to an
ordinary citizen. Possible interpretations of police behavior, as
well as possible interpretations of the defendant's behavior,
should thus enter into a reasonable suspicion analysis. Just as
flight is susceptible to multiple innocent explanations, so may po-
lice behavior be seen as menacing or harassing to the ordinary
resident of a high-crime neighborhood whose prior experiences
135. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
136. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 68.
137. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 485.
138. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (stating that "reasonableness... is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances"); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 159 (5th
Cir. 1992).
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with law enforcement officers might understandably taint his
perception of the police activity. In this case, even assuming that
the police caravan was the stimulus for Wardlow's flight, the fact
that he chose to avoid the police in a dangerous neighborhood in
Chicago-a city with a history of poor race relations between citi-
zens and the police and a corresponding history of oppressive po-
lice tactics-should be accorded some consideration.3 9
2. High-Crime "Neighborhood"?
Additionally, if the characterization of a neighborhood as "high-
crime" is to enter into the reasonable suspicion analysis, the
neighborhood itself should be narrowly circumscribed and specifi-
cally defined. 4 ° Otherwise, the character of the "neighborhood" is
too broad a factor; it fails to meaningfully distinguish one citizen
in that area from another, and therefore should not enter into the
reasonable-suspicion analysis at all. If a high-crime "neighbor-
hood" of 98,000 people is considered sufficiently defined, then the
police could easily expand this concept in order to characterize
entire towns or cities as "high-crime." Then, any citizen residing
in that "high-crime" town or city could be stopped and searched-
under Wardlow-for a minimal level of evasive or otherwise sus-
picious behavior.
In addition, Wardlow raises the question of whether the char-
acterization of a neighborhood as "low-crime" could potentially be
used to validate otherwise suspicious behavior. If the converse of
Wardlow is taken as true, then in the absence of other "specific,
articulable facts," the exact same behavior being used to establish
reasonable suspicion in one part of town could be excused just a
few miles away. Such a location-based differential should be ve-
hemently rejected rather than condoned by the Court, for it al-
lows police to use factors which have a disproportionate impact on
139. As Justice Stevens noted:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime
areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent,
but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can it-
self be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the offi-
cer's sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither "aber-
rant" nor "abnormal."
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. See Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 68.
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a lower socioeconomic class in order to establish reasonable sus-
picion, engendering fresh tension between the police and the poor
(and often minority) residents of these areas.
3. Scope of the Search
Justice Stevens drew attention to the fact that Terry recog-
nized only a "narrowly drawn authority" that is "limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons."14' Although the
majority stated that the Court granted certiorari only on the
question of whether the initial stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion, and expressed no opinion as to the lawfulness of the
frisk itself,' the two determinations should not be uncoupled.
Even with the existence of reasonable suspicion, a search may be
unconstitutional if it is unnecessary (the officer has no reason to
believe the suspect is armed and dangerous),' or if it exceeds the
limited pat-down allowed by Terry."M
In Terry, the Court cautioned that "a search which is reason-
able at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue
of its intolerable intensity and scope." 4 ' Thus, the scope of the in-
trusion is intended to be a central element in determining its rea-
sonableness.'46 Accordingly, the Court should have considered a
second, crucial aspect of this case: since a search conducted pur-
suant to a Terry stop should be limited to that which is reasona-
bly necessary to discover weapons, 4 ' and in light of the fact that
the officer had probable cause to believe that the bag contained a
weapon,"~ would the permissible scope of the Terry stop then ex-
tend to opening this closed container?
Under the circumstances of this case, since the officer appar-
141. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968)).
142. Id. at 124 n.2.
143. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
144. Id. at 30.
145. Id. at 18; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in result); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347-48 (1957) (per curiam); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931).
146. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15.
147. See id. at 26 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., con-
curring)).
148. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000).
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ently felt the gun inside the bag,'49 removal of the bag from the
defendant was necessary to ensure the safety of the officers.
However, the more pressing question is whether the officer could
constitutionally open the bag in light of the fact that it was recov-
ered through a search founded on reasonable suspicion rather
than probable cause. The Supreme Court has held that investiga-
tive methods employed by the police are intended to be the "least
intrusive means reasonably available," 50 and where removal of
the bag would suffice, opening it was unnecessary and therefore
exceeded the permissible bounds of the stop.'' In other words,
"[tihe scope of a Terry-type 'investigative' stop and any attendant
search must be extremely limited or the Terry exception would
'swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures [and
searches] are reasonable only if based on probable cause."' 152
However, since courts have allowed a gradual expansion of the
scope of the Terry stop,'53 it is likely that the Supreme Court
would have ruled that the search was constitutional since the in-
criminating nature of the recovered evidence was immediately
apparent to the searching officer under the so-called "plain-feel"
exception to the warrant requirement.14 That is, once the officer
felt the gun inside the bag, he had established probable cause for
arrest, and could therefore constitutionally open the bag in order
to search its contents.'55 Nevertheless, the Court erred in failing
to even consider this question.
149. Id.
150. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
151 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) ("Where law enforcement
authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of
a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to
permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents.. .. ")
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 834-35 (1982) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (asserting that a closed paper bag may be seized, but not searched, without
a warrant).
152. Royer, 460 U.S. at 510 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979))
(second alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
153. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
154 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-77 (1993) (holding that contraband
discovered through the sense of touch does not exceed the scope of a permitted search so
long as its incriminating character is immediately apparent); cf Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1972) (holding that the warrantless seizure of an item that
comes within the plain view of an officer in a position to view the item may be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment).
155. But compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Court noted that "we do
not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure." Id. at 20.
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Further, an even more intriguing question would be whether
the officers could have opened a different kind of container recov-
ered incident to a Terry stop, such as a locked briefcase. In the
absence of the consent of the owner, but with probable cause to
believe it contained weapons (perhaps based on the weight of the
briefcase), would the officers have been justified in opening it, or
would they have had to obtain a search warrant? As noted by
Justice Marshall in Florida v. Jimeno:56
[Tihis Court has soundly rejected any distinction between "Worthy"
containers, like locked briefcases, and "unworthy" containers, like
paper bags.
Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series
of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and
orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other,
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a
distinction. For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is
absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the
most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a
toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or
knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions
from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the
locked attache case.
157
4. Immediacy of the Criminal Conduct
The Court also failed to contemplate another vital aspect of the
Terry holding: the rationale behind the exception to probable
cause is based on a reasonable suspicion of immediate criminal
activity.' That is, if there is no indication that a crime has been
committed, is being committed, or is imminently likely to occur,
probable cause should be the guiding standard, and the police
should be limited to following the suspect and using other evi-
dence gathering techniques in order to establish probable
cause.
15 9
156. 500 U.s. 248 (1991).
157. Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
822 (1982)).
158. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
159. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[Blefore detaining an individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that
he is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment.") (alteration in origi-
nal).
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In Wardlow, there is scant evidence that the seizure was nec-
essary to prevent a crime; the flight of the defendant indicated
that even if a crime was about to occur, it was no longer so immi-
nent as to justify a search and seizure based on reasonable suspi-
cion alone. The Court's failure to consider this aspect of the case,
however, is consistent with the general approach it has taken in
stop-and-frisk cases since Terry: gradually, reasonable suspicion
has been divorced from a dependence upon the immediacy of the
criminal conduct of which the individual is suspected. 6 '
5. Chipping Away at the "Individual" in Individualized
Suspicion
In practice, the rule announced in Wardlow-that flight from
the police in a high-crime area is sufficient to establish reason-
able suspicion 1 -greatly increases the number of people who
may now be constitutionally stopped, primarily because a major-
ity of "high-crime" areas are located in the populous inner-
cities.'62 Any resident of these areas whose behavior could be seen
as evasive may now theoretically be stopped and searched, de-
spite the rationale behind the evasive behavior and notwith-
standing the fact that the citizen lives or works in that area.'63
Further, the Court articulates that the determination of rea-
sonable suspicion must be made "on commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior."" Although appearing to es-
160. Contra United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (emphasizing that stops
must be assessed by viewing all of the facts and asking whether there is "some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity").
16L Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
162. See Harris, supra note 34, at 677.
163. For an interesting insight, see Harris, supra note 34. Harris argues that location
may actually be used as a proxy for race in the decision to stop a suspect, since most resi-
dents of high-crime areas are poor minorities. Thus, if they decide to evade the police-of-
ten based on a fear of the police themselves-the police may stop them. "In other words,
every person who works or lives in a high crime area and who avoids the police is subject
to automatic seizure, and subject to automatic search if the crime suspected involves
drugs."Id. at 680-81.
164 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. But see Milton Hirsch & David 0. Markus, Fourth
Amendment Forum: Illinois v. Wardlow: The Wicked Flee When No Man Pursueth, 24
CHAMPION 38, 39-40 (June 2000). The authors criticize the "commonsense judgments"
standard, pointing out that:
[J]udgments and inferences about human behavior, whether commonsensical
or otherwise, are inadequate building blocks to support a system of constitu-
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tablish a quasi-objective standard, this statement masks the fact
that the individual making the "commonsense judgment" is a law
enforcement officer, whose conclusions are allowed to be biased by
his own experience. To a seasoned police officer, almost any con-
duct may be considered indicative of wrongdoing.6 5 Hence, this
standard fails to meaningfully distinguish one class of citizens
from the next, and ultimately broadens the ability of the police to
stop almost any citizen for actions appearing even minimally sus-
picious.
Thus, Wardlow represents a retreat from the Terry rationale
that a citizen may only be stopped based upon a particularized
suspicion of wrongdoing.'66 The Wardlow factors considered suffi-
cient to establish reasonable suspicion are not specific enough to
permit an innocent citizen to be differentiated from one who is ac-
tually guilty. Each fact contributing to the reasonable suspicion
analysis should increase the probability that a crime has been, is
being, or is about to be committed. Furthermore, the characteris-
tic must be more often present when a crime is being committed
tional jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court is empowered and
obligated to exercise its jurisdiction to correct mistakes of law made by lower
courts. It is not obligated to superimpose its own notion of common sense, or
of the inferences properly drawn from human conduct, upon lower courts.
Id. at 39.
165. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J.
214 (1983). Citing a variety of cases, Johnson notes:
Law enforcement agents cite an amazing variety of behavior as indicating
consciousness of guilt. Police have inferred an attempt to conceal both from a
traffic violator's reach toward the dashboard or floor of a car, and from his
alighting from the car and walking toward the police. Drug Enforcement
Agency officers have inferred a desire to avoid detection both from a trav-
eler's being the last passenger to get off a plane and from his being the first.
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents have argued both that it was
suspicious that the occupants of a vehicle reacted nervously when a patrol car
passed, and that it was suspicious that the occupants failed to look at the pa-
trol car. Finally, the government has argued in a customs case that "exces-
sive" calmness is suspicious.
Id. at 219-20. Thus, no matter how the suspect reacts upon sighting the police, officers ap-
pear to be able to interpret that behavior in such a way as to arrive at the same conclu-
sion: that the suspect appears "guilty," and should be detained.
166. See Raymond, supra note 41, at 108-09 ("[r]easonable suspicion must meaning-
fully narrow the category of 'stop-eligible' persons."). Raymond goes on to explain that "[i]f
the particularized behavior observed does not distinguish the individual stopped from the
rest of his neighborhood, the inquiry must come to an end; if he can be stopped, so can eve-
ryone who lives in his community, and the limiting fumction of the reasonable suspicion
inquiry is lost." Id. at 128.
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than when it is not; otherwise, it has no probative value.'67
The character of the neighborhood, however, is a static desig-
nation-that is, it is always present, regardless of whether a
crime is being committed or not-and hence can contribute little
or nothing to a reasonable suspicion analysis. Consequently, oth-
erwise innocent conduct-or conduct susceptible to multiple inno-
cent explanations-should not become sinister by the mere fact
that it takes place in a high-crime area. 6 "
In sum, where the character of the neighborhood and evasive
behavior are used as the only "specific articulable facts" to estab-
lish reasonable suspicion, those facts fail to make one citizen dis-
cernable from another for two reasons. One, a large number of
people work and live in "high-crime" neighborhoods, and two, al-
most any behavior may be interpreted as evasive. Hence, Ward-
low ultimately represents yet another step away from the basic,
underlying principles of Terry, for it essentially obliterates any
meaningful standard by which individualized suspicion may be
judged. For all practical purposes, those who have the most to
fear from an encounter with the police have now been stripped of
their fundamental constitutional right to go about their business
(especially if they choose to exercise that right "at top speed"),'69
ultimately leaving the police free to declare open-season on resi-
dents of the "high-crime" inner-cities. 7 °
167. For further discussion, see Johnson, supra note 165. Johnson points out that:
Because probable cause contemplates the totality of the circumstances, a
relevant fact is one that adds to the likelihood of criminal activity, given the
other facts also observed. On the one hand, a bulge at the waistband may be
significantly related to the carrying of contraband, but if it is observed in
conjunction with other signs of obesity, it has no probative value. On the
other hand, although riding a bike probably is not statistically related to the
commission of any crime, riding one late at night in a warehouse district may
correlate highly with participation in a burglary. Essentially, a reasonable
police officer ignores those facts that, controlling for other observed facts, do
not increase the likelihood of criminal activity.
Id. at 217.
168. See In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 1987).
169. See People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451,460 (Mich. 1985).
170. See generally Adam B. Wolf, Note, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence in Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 711 (2000).
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F. Current Court Interpretations
Despite the possible negative implications of Wardlow, most
lower courts have been hesitant to invoke its holding in order to
diverge from pre-existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Courts still recognize the right of a citizen to refuse to cooperate
with the police and continue about his business,'17' and have con-
tinued to hold that the factors considered by the police must serve
to distinguish the stopped individual from "the broader universe
of law-abiding citizens. ""' In addition, courts have reaffirmed the
principles that evidence recovered from a pat-down conducted in
the absence of a belief that the defendant is armed and dangerous
is inadmissible, 17 that the reasonable suspicion exception to the
probable cause requirement is not designed to uncover evidence of
illicit activity but is instead intended to allow the officer to safely
pursue his investigation,'74 and that the factors used to establish
reasonable suspicion must indicate imminent criminal activity.'75
Courts have differed in their determination of behavior suffi-
cient to invoke the holding in Wardlow. For example, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has stated that evasive behavior not
amounting to "headlong flight" is insufficient to establish reason-
able suspicion under Wardlow."7 ' However, a Florida court has
171. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968)); Peters v. State, 531 S.E.2d 386, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000);
Banks v. Commonwealth, No. 1999-CA-000692-MR, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 66, at *9 (Ky.
Ct. App. June 23, 2000); State v. Warfield, No. 23932-9-I, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1299,
at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. July 21, 2000). But see, e.g., State v. Hill, No. 1999-CA-00196, 2000
Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, at *10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2000) (affirming the reasonable-
ness of a stop based on flight in a high-crime area after the officer had indicated a desire
to speak with the suspect).
172. United States v. Powell, No. 99-5137, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6131, at *9 (6th Cir.
Mar. 29, 2000) (reported in table format at 210 F.3d 373); see also United States v. Mon-
tero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez-Guillen
v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 211 (2000) (holding that the Hispanic appearance of a suspect
is of so little probative value that it may not be considered where particularized suspicion
is required).
173. State v. Myers, 756 So. 2d 343, 355 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
174. See Powell, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6131, at *14.
175. United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000).
176. Bass v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 921, 925 n.3 (Va. 2000); cfi Smith v. State, 538
S.E.2d 517, 520-21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that in the absence of evidence that the
police presence served as the stimulus for defendant's departure, the defendant's actions
did not constitute flight from the police); Peters v. State, 531 S.E.2d 386, 389 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that the defendant's act of continuing toward his car after spotting the po-
lice in a high-crime area was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
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held that the act of merely backing away from the police after the
suspect's companions had already fled was sufficiently evasive to
establish reasonable suspicion in an area known for narcotics
transactions.' Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has supported an in-
ference of reasonable suspicion drawn from the combination of an
anonymous tip and the evasive action of dropping an object off a
bridge before talking with the police. 7 8
In the absence of flight, when the defendant is seized in a high-
crime neighborhood, courts have required some other independ-
ently suspicious behavior in order to establish reasonable suspi-
cion. 79 Generally, courts have also required evasive behavior to
be corroborated with another suspicious activity or circumstance
to establish reasonable suspicion,"s even if the defendant is en-
countered in a high-crime area.' 8' For example, courts have sup-
plemented the two Wardlow factors with holdings that the time of
arrest should also be a significant factor where flight occurs in a
high-crime neighborhood,8 2 and that the act of disposing of a pa-
per bag after noticing police in the area was sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion when combined with unprovoked flight in a
neighborhood known for narcotics transactions.'83 Courts have
additionally utilized the decision in Wardlow to hold that evasive
behavior, when coupled with a reliable description of the suspect,
is sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest.M
177. Copeland v. State, 756 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
178. United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000).
179. See Ex parte James, No. 1980820, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 272, at *10 (Ala. June 23,
2000); State v. F.J., 734 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, No. 8:00CR147, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13552,
at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2000); United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir.
2000); State v. Wright, 752 A.2d 1147, 1155 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Delaware, 731
N.E.2d 904, 910 (I. App. Ct. 2000).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Stone, No. 00-1156, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23458, at *11 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2000);
United States v. Fisher, No. 99-5979, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22214, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 21,
2000).
182. State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). This holding implies that
a suspect observed fleeing at 3:00 am. in a high-crime neighborhood could appear rea-
sonably suspicious to justify a stop, although the same suspect fleeing in the same neigh-
borhood at 3:00 p.m. might not be.
183. Wise v. State, 751 A.2d 24, 27 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
184. United States v. Simms, No. 99-0661-02, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15467, at *7-9
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2000); Menard v. Chicago, No. 98 C 4859, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6381,
at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000); State v. Hammond, 759 A.2d 133, 137-38 (Conn. App. Ct.
2000); see also United States v. Gooden, No. 00-092, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369, at *7,
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IV. INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF APPEARING "REASONABLY
Suspicious"
The Supreme Court has held a number of factors relevant in
determining reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, including
the physical appearance of the defendant,'85 the behavior of the
defendant," 6 the place where the stop occurs,8 7 and other infor-
mation made available to the police prior to sighting the defen-
dant.8 ' Generally, in order to establish reasonable suspicion,
courts have required both a behavioral and a circumstantial ele-
ment. Considering the holding in Wardlow, the main question
now becomes which factors, standing alone (if any), and which




Physical characteristics considered relevant in a Fourth
Amendment analysis include mode of dress and haircut,'89 a "hip-
pie" appearance,"' race,"' gender,"' age,' 9' and factors correlated
(E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2000) (holding that an anonymous tip and threatening motions are suffi-
cient to establish reasonable suspicion); Sullivan v. State, 753 A.2d 601, 605 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000) (holding that the act of walking away and a reliable description of the suspect
are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
185. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
189. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975).
190. See United States v. Sherman, 430 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 908 (1971).
191. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 877 (stating that Mexican ancestry, while alone
insufficient to establish suspicion, may be considered in determining illegal alien status);
see also United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the "en-
tire situation" may be considered when formulating probable cause, including the fact that
the suspected burglars were racially "out of place"), cert. denied sub nom. McNeil v. United
States, 500 U.S. 936 (1991); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (allowing eth-
nicity to be used as one of "several factors" warranting further investigation). For a list of
sources discussing the use of race in law enforcement decisions, see Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957
n.1 (1999). For a list of examples illustrating the proposition that African-American men
and women are stopped more frequently than their white counterparts, see Washington v.
Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996), and Schwartz, supra note 2, at 360 n.184.
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with wealth or poverty.'94 None of these factors alone has been
held to constitute reasonable suspicion,'95 although frequently
they are grouped together to form a drug courier profile'96 or are
otherwise considered together to establish a general likelihood of
wrongdoing.197 However, reliance on personal appearance alone,
especially immutable characteristics such as gender, race, and
age, should never be enough to constitute reasonable suspicion;'98
Five places in which courts have allowed race to "tip the scale" in determining reasonable
suspicion are in identifying a particular subject, when a member of a particular race ap-
pears incongruous in his surroundings, in searching for illegal aliens, as a part of drug
courier profiles, and as proof of a general criminal propensity. See Johnson, supra note
165, at 225-37. Johnson, in arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to any decision
to use race in the reasonable suspicion analysis, makes the insightful point that police ac-
tion based on racial incongruity fosters racial separation by deterring residential integra-
tion because it sends an implicit message to blacks that their decision to live in "white"
areas is unwelcome. Id. at 245-46.
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme Court declared that
possible racial motivations of the arresting officer were irrelevant in a Fourth Amendment
analysis since the reasonableness of the intrusion should be measured in objective terms
based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 813. See also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 38-39 (1996), and Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 n.7, where the Court held
that the subjective intent of the officer is relevant only to the extent that the intent is con-
veyed to the person confronted. Thus, any perceived racial discriminatory animus behind a
Terry stop may be vindicated only by resorting to the Equal Protection Clause. For further
discussion on this topic, see Thompson, supra note 191 at 960-61 & n.17, and Tracey Mar-
lin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 354-62 (1998).
192. An example would be stopping a man because he is carrying a woman's purse. See
Johnson, supra note 165, at 252-53.
193. Generally, police will claim that young adults have a higher propensity for being
involved in criminal activity. See id. at 221 n.31.
194. For example, a well-dressed man in a low-income neighborhood may appear suspi-
cious, as could a shabbily dressed man in a wealthy neighborhood. See id. at 253-54.
195. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86 (stating that Mexican ancestry, while
alone insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, may be considered).
196. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (holding that the use of a
"drug courier profile" was permissible in establishing reasonable suspicion). But see Har-
ris, supra note 34, at 666. Harris advocates the elimination of the use of a drug courier
profile to justify a Terry stop due to the fact that the suspected criminal activity is not
immediate, and hence there is no reason officers should be exempt from the probable
cause requirement in those situations.
197. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (stating "appearance and con-
duct in general" were adequate to establish reasonable suspicion).
198. See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By requiring reason-
able suspicion.., the Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected
to 'overbearing or harassing' police conduct carried out solely on the basis of imprecise
stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal characteris-
tics such as race.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968)); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
at 889 (Douglas, J., concurring) (criticizing the reasonable suspicion standard because the
"nature of the test permits the police to interfere as well with a multitude of law-abiding
citizens, whose only transgression may be a nonconformist appearance or attitude").
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rather, physical appearance, if used at all, should only be consid-
ered in conjunction with a circumstantial or behavioral element.
The Wardlow decision, especially because it dealt primarily with
the site of the encounter and the behavior of the defendant,
should not have much of an impact on this aspect of Fourth
Amendment analysis, for it is doubtful that courts would loosen
their standards to the point that a stereotype alone would be suf-
ficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
2. Surroundings
The Supreme Court recognized as long ago as 1824 that the lo-
cation of suspicious behavior is relevant to, though not dispositive
of, Fourth Amendment analysis.199 Since that time, the environ-
ment in which the suspect is located has gradually been allowed
to assume more and more importance, 200 although courts still ref-
use to rule that the character of the neighborhood alone is suffi-
cient to establish probable cause.2°' Since Wardlow explicitly re-
affirmed this principle, this area of Fourth Amendment law
should not undergo any significant modification.
However, allowance of this consideration has come under in-
creasing attack in recent years. It has been noted by the courts
that doubt exists as to whether there is "any city in the country
which a DEA agent will not characterize as either a major nar-
cotics distribution center or a city through which drug couriers
pass on their way to a major narcotics distribution center."20 2 In
addition, one commentator has noted that "[slome police officers
describe all areas as 'crime-prone."'2 3 Wealthy areas may be clas-
sified as "high-crime" because they are burglary-prone, whereas
low-income areas may be classified as "high-crime" because they
199. In re the Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 374 (1824) (holding that the geographi-
cal position of a vessel seized in a remote area known for smuggling was relevant to the
determination of probable cause).
200. Some police will attempt to detain a suspect for mere residence in a ghetto. See
Johnson, supra note 165, at 222 n.42 (listing cases).
201. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884; see
also Harris, supra note 34, at 672 n.135 (listing cases); Raymond, supra note 41, at 114
n.58 (listing cases).
202. United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 567 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Brooks v. United States, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
203. Johnson, supra note 165, at 222 n.42; see also Raymond, supra note 41, at 116
n.63.
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have high incidences of violence or drug-related crimes. °4
Further, when a neighborhood is classified as "high-crime,"
that classification should only be used to establish reasonable
suspicion in situations in which the suspected crime is the same
as the crime having a high prevalence in the area. That is, if the
area is said to have a high incidence of burglary, but a low inci-
dence of rape, the character of the neighborhood should not factor
into the reasonable suspicion analysis for a rape suspect, al-
though it could if the same individual were suspected of burglary
instead. °5
An interesting and logical proposition has been set forth, con-
tending that the character of the neighborhood should not be con-
sidered in a reasonable suspicion analysis unless the behavior of
the suspect "is not common amongst law-abiding persons at the
time and place observed."20 6 That is,
By allowing the evidence of the character of the neighborhood to
dominate the reasonable suspicion inquiry, courts may become pre-
disposed to believe the worst of persons found there and, accordingly,
to accept the most minimal particularized observations as sufficient
to support a determination of reasonable suspicion. But if those par-
ticularized observations merely identify behavior in which law-
abiding persons in the area routinely engage, they do nothing to nar-




Thus, a logical conclusion would be that the behavior of the sus-
pect should be considered before the character of the neighbor-
hood is permitted to enter into the reasonable-suspicion analysis.
B. Behavior Element
Behavioral factors which have been considered relevant to a
reasonable-suspicion determination include obvious attempts to
evade detection by law enforcement officers," paying cash for ex-
204. See Johnson, supra note 165, at 222 n.42.
205. Id.
206. Raymond, supra note 41, at 127.
207. Id.
208. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885;
United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Amuny,
767 F.2d 1113, 1124 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Raymond, supra note 41, at 131 nn.94-95
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pensive plane tickets," 9 failure to check luggage,210 traveling un-
der an assumed name, 21 and staying only forty-eight hours in a
city known to be a center of drug activity after a twenty-hour
flight.1 2 Mere association with suspicious characters has been
held insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion,1 although no
court has held that it may not be considered at all.2 1 4 The two
ways in which behavior may be considered relevant are as con-
duct resembling a crime or necessary preparation for a crime, and
as conduct that appears to reflect a consciousness of guilt.215 The
holding in Wardlow gives an added legitimacy to the use of fac-
tors which fall into the second category; hence, lower courts will
become increasingly lenient when faced with defendants seized
and searched because of evasive behavior. Also, since Wardlow
failed to hold that flight alone would be insufficient grounds for
reasonable suspicion, there should be a gradual increase in courts
permitting similar rationalizations. Thus, behavior from which an
inference of wrongdoing can logically be drawn will retain a
prominent place in the reasonable-suspicion analysis, and courts
will likely begin to allow increasingly broad interpretations of
otherwise innocent behavior in order to establish reasonable sus-
picion.
C. Information Available to the Police
Terry stops have also been approved when the evidence used to
establish reasonable suspicion is either a suspect profile or an
anonymous tip.216 In cases involving the latter, courts are permit-
(listing cases). On an interesting note, although flight may be used to establish reasonable
suspicion, the Supreme Court has held that mere pursuit does not constitute a seizure.
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); accord Silva, 957 F.2d at 159.
209. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989). Justice Marshall concluded
that "using cash may simply reflect inability to obtain or aversion to plastic money." Id. at
16-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
210. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8-9.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43 (1968).
214. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62-63; Peo-
ple v. Pugh, 217 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1966).
215. See Johnson, supra note 165, at 218. In addition, it should be clarified that "the
'relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of
suspicion that is attached to particular types of noncriminal acts.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 463 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)).
216. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
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ted to use a sliding scale in making their evaluation, where the
trustworthiness of the informant determines the degree of cor-
roboration required before the seizure may occur.217 Wardlow
should have little or no impact on the use of these factors in the
reasonable-suspicion analysis, for officers in these situations are
attempting to discover a described suspect for a known crime, and
their observations necessarily differ from those of an officer who
notices suspicious behavior and only then is alerted to the possi-
bility of criminal activity.
D. Combining Factors to Establish Reasonable Suspicion:
Everyone's a Suspect
To date, the combination of factors most likely to establish rea-
sonable suspicion requires a behavioral element (such as flight)
and a circumstantial element (such as location).2" Generally, the
factors most frequently used in the reasonable-suspicion analysis
appear innocent when considered alone; the taint of guilt attaches
only when one element is considered in conjunction with another.
Wardlow, by condoning the combination of behavior and loca-
tion without consideration of specific relevant facts,219 nudged the
judiciary one step closer to the establishment of a dreaded "bright
line" rule. Thus, courts will be increasingly lenient when consid-
ering cases involving behavior and any other circumstantial ele-
ment, regardless of possible motivations for the suspicious be-
havior or reason for the existence of the circumstance. Ultimately,
the end result will be the obliteration of any meaningful differen-
tiation between classes of citizens. One way or another, police are
now able to "constitutionally" classify essentially anyone as a
suspect and subject him to the "limited" search and seizure sanc-
tioned by Terry.
266, 270 (2000) ("[Tlhere are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated,
exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the inves-
tigatory stop.") (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327).
217. See Harris, supra note 34, at 667-68; see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 275-76 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (discussing factors to be weighed in determining reliability of an anony-
mous tip).
218. For cases describing suspicious behavior in a high-crime location held sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion, see Harris, supra note 34, at 675 n.139 and Raymond, su-
pra note 41, at 119 nn.64-65. For cases describing suspicious behavior in a high-crime lo-
cation held insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, see Harris, supra note 34, at 675
n.140.
219. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION: READY TO RUN? WATCH YOUR STEP....
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the posses-
sion and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law .... "20
Ultimately considered a victory for the law enforcement com-
munity, Terry weakened the rights not just of criminal defen-
dants, but of the public at large, greatly increasing the likelihood
that innocent people will be stopped and subjected to a search
which has ceased to be reasonably (or constitutionally) limited in
scope.22' Since its inception, the concept of reasonable suspicion
has undergone a gradual metamorphosis; it has expanded to en-
compass increasingly indiscriminate factors, and the assessment
of those factors requires less and less justification.
Wardlow's apparent legacy is the addition of another combina-
tion of factors sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, serving
to further broaden instances in which an acceptable inference of
criminal wrongdoing may be drawn. By holding that the act of
fleeing from the police in a high-crime neighborhood is sufficient
to constitute reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, Wardlow adds
yet another "constitutional" set of circumstances upon which the
police may depend in their ever-vigilant quest to arbitrarily en-
force the power granted to them by the courts.222 As the judicial
system continues to loosen the constraints originally imposed by
the Fourth Amendment, more and more citizens are being
stopped for little or no justification, and those stops are being ex-
plained away by a combination of any number of innocent fac-
tors.223 Unless the courts are willing to backpedal and return to
220. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (quoted in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
221. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 331.
222. "A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary
effect of legitimizing the conduct which has produced the evidence .... ." Terry, 392 U.S. at
13.
223. Increasingly, the Supreme Court seems to have forgotten that "[the [Fourth]
Amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective
enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was
adopted." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
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the original, narrowly circumscribed holding of Terry, citizens on
the street will continue to see their rights and expectations
gradually fade into nonexistence.
Margaret Anne Hoehl

